Columbia HCA and Zurich American Insurance v. Stewart Seely and Utah Labor Commission : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2010
Columbia HCA and Zurich American Insurance v.
Stewart Seely and Utah Labor Commission : Brief
of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Sandra Dredge; Alan Hennebold; Utah Labor Commission; attorneys for respondents.
Brad J. Miller; Thomas, Pollart & Miller; attorney for appellants.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Columbia HCA v. Seely, No. 20100788 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2010).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2519
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
COLUMBIA HCA and 
ZURICH AMERICAN 
INSURANCE, ; 
Appellants/Petitioners, ' 
vs. ] 
STEWART SEELY and UTAH LABOR 
COMMISSION, 
Appellees/Respondents. 
) APPELLEE STEWART SEELY'S BRIEF 
) Appeal No. 20100788 
) Agency Decision No. 05-0994 
Sandra Dredge, Esq. 
226 West 2230 North, Suite 100 
Provo, UT 84604 
For Respondent Stewart Seely 
Alan Hennebold, Esq. 
Utah Labor Commission 
Adjudication Division 
P.O. Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615 
For Respondent Utah Labor Commission 
^ 
Brad J. Miller, Esq. 
Thomas Pollart & Miller, LLC 
5600 S. Quebec St. Ste 220A 
Greenwood Village, CO 80111 
For Petitioners Columbia HCA and 
Zurich American Insurance Co. 
UTAH APPEL 
FEB 1 0 2011 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
COLUMBIA HCA and 
ZURICH AMERICAN 
INSURANCE, ; 
Appellants/Petitioners, ] 
vs. ] 
STEWART SEELY and UTAH 
LABOR COMMISSION, ; 
Appellees/Respondents. ] 
) APPELLEE STEWART SEELY'S 
) BRIEF 
) Appeal No. 20100788 
) Agency Decision No. 05-0994 
11 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 2 
OPINIONS BELOW 3 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 3 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 8 
ARGUMENT 9 
I. THE LABOR COMMISSION'S DECISION WAS 
CORRECT BECAUSE 1) COLUMBIA DID NOT 
PRESERVE THIS ISSUE FOR APPEAL, 2) THE 
REJECTED REEMPLOYMENT PLAN WAS DEFECTIVE 
FOR A MYRIAD OF REASONS, AND 3) THE ALJ'S 
FINDINGS OF FACT WAS CLEAR AND LEFT NO 
CONFLICTS UNRESOLVED 9 
A. Columbia's Silence as to the Findings of Fact did not 
Preserve this Issue 9 
B. The Labor Commission correctly rejected the 
reemployment plan 11 
1. Columbia was not prejudiced by the alleged error 11 
2. The Labor Commission's rejection of a defective 
reemployment plan is legally permissible 13 
3. The ALJ did not leave any conflicts unresolved 14 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE COMMISSION'S 
DECISION BECAUSE THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
JUDGE PROPERLY FOLLOWED THE PROCEDURES IN 
AWARDING SEELY PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY 
BENEFITS 17 
CONCLUSION 20 
1 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844 (Utah 1998) 
Carter v. Labor Comm'n Appeals Board, 153 P.3d 763 (Utah App. 2006) 
Color Country Management v. Labor Comm'n, 38 P.3d 969 (Utah App. 2001) 
Martinez v. Media Paymaster Plus. 164 P.3d 384 (Utah 2007) 
Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251 (Utah 1997) 
Strate V. Labor Comm'n, 136 P.3d 1273 (Utah App. 2006) 
Tschaggenv v. Milbank Ins. Co.. 163 P.3d 615 (Utah 2007) 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-303(6) 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-801(8)(a) 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(l) 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(a) 
2 
OPINIONS BELOW 
The opinion of the Utah Labor Commission is contained in the Record at 159-162. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final order of the Utah Labor Commission. This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 34A-l-303(6); 34A-2-801(8)(a); 63G-4-
403(1); and 78A-4-103(2)(a). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
This case arises from the Labor Commission's decision concluding that the 
Administrative Law Judge's decisions and orders were adequate in awarding Respondent 
Stuart Seely ("Seely") permanent total disability benefits under Utah Code Annotated 
("UCA") §34A-2-413. 
Specifically, Appellant ("Columbia") contends that the Administrative Law Judge 
("ALJ") failed tol) resolve all conflicts in the evidence and 2) make requisite findings 
regarding whether successful rehabilitation was possible. 
While the Labor Commission is the ultimate finder of fact, Columbia refers 
directly to the ALJ throughout its brief. See Carter v. Labor Comm'n. 153 P.3d 763, 767 
(Utah App. 2006). Although there is a distinction between the ALJ's findings and the 
Labor Commission's ultimate findings, that distinction is minimal considering the Labor 
Commission adopted the ALJ's Findings of Fact. (R. 159.) 
Seely believes the issues are best addressed in the following order: 
Issue 1. Did the Labor Commission err in rejecting Columbia's contention that the 
ALJ left issues unresolved? Columbia contends that unresolved conflicts in the ALJ's 
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Findings of Fact led to Columbia's creation of a defective reemployment plan. Columbia 
does not contest the Findings of Fact as inaccurate, only that the ALJ did not make 
findings of fact as required by law. 
Standard of Review: "The adequacy of findings is a question of law" to be 
reviewed "under a correction of error standard." Strate v. Labor Comm'n, 136 P.3d 1273, 
1276-77 (Utah App. 2007). 
Preservation for Review: Seely believes Columbia did not preserve this issue for 
review. Please refer to the argument below. 
Issue 2. Did the Labor Commission err in concluding that the ALJ made requisite 
findings regarding whether successful rehabilitation was possible? Columbia asserts that 
the defective reemployment plan made it impossible for the ALJ to find that no 
successful rehabilitation was possible for Seely. 
Standard of Review: "The adequacy of findings is a question of law" to be 
reviewed "under a correction of error standard." Strate v. Labor Comm'n, 136 P.3d 1273, 
1276-77 (Utah App. 2007). 
Preservation for Review: Insomuch as this issue is contingent on the first issue 
above, Seely believes that Columbia did not preserve this issue. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A full and unprejudiced recitation of the underlying facts can be found on pages 
1-4 of the Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ") Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
("Findings of Fact") dated January 5, 2007. (R. 93-99.) Subsequent procedural facts and 
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findings can be found in the ALJ's September 3, 2007 Order of Permanent and Total 
Disability ("Final Order"). (R. 123-126.) The Labor Commission's August 31, 2010 
Order Affirming ALJ's Decision gave the Labor Commission's final decision regarding 
this claim which can be found on pages 159-162 of the record. Below is a recitation of 
the facts and procedural history pertinent to this appeal. 
Appellee Seely injured his low back in 1996 working at St. Mark's Hospital, 
owned by Appellant Columbia. (R. 93.) He was diagnosed with a lumbar herniated disc. 
R. 94. He had surgery and was left with a 10% permanent impairment rating. (R. 94.) 
After transferring to Timpanogos Regional Hospital, which is also owned by 
Columbia, Seely again hurt his back moving a heavy patient. (R. 94.) He was diagnosed 
with a herniated disc and received injections, a discectomy, and a nerve root 
decompression. (R. 94.) After subpar recovery, Seely had another decompression and a 
pedicle screw fixation later that same year. (R. 94.) At that time, he was given a 15% 
permanent impairment rating. (R. 94.) 
In 2002, the pedicle screws were removed. (R. 94.) Facet injections were later 
administered. (R.94.) In 2003, an EMG revealed mild right L5 radiculopathy. (R. 95.) 
The medical record indicates Seely experienced other work injuries for which he sought 
treatment. (R. 95.) 
Seely was terminated on May 20, 2003, for alleged drug possession and has not 
worked since. (R. 95.) Seely continued treatment, which included an ineffective nerve 
root block and a nerve root decompression. (R. 95.) Seely was given a combined 23% 
permanent impairment rating. (R. 95.) 
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Seely began seeing a pain specialist in January 2005, who noted that Seely's daily 
living activities were significantly hindered by his back condition. (R. 96.) 
Seely filed an Application for Hearing on November 14, 2005. (R. 93.) Among 
other reliefs requested, Seely requested permanent total disability benefits. (R. 93.) A 
hearing was held. 
In her Findings of Fact, the ALJ recited Seely's long medical treatment history and 
concluded with: 1) Seely testified he could only sit/stand for 30 minutes at a time; 2) his 
maximum lift was 35 pounds; 3) he was 58 years old; 4) he has a high school diploma; 5) 
he worked as a radiology technician since 1972; 7) he worked in hospitals and was in the 
Navy prior to 1972; 6) he is deaf in his left ear; and 7) he was willing to work and desired 
retraining. (R. 96.) 
After reciting the requirements for establishing permanent total disability 
eligibility, the ALJ additionally stated that 1) Seely sustained significant impairments, 2) 
he was not gainfully employed, 3) his back injuries prevented him from performing the 
essential functions of a radiology technician, 4) he has no skills outside that of a 
radiology technician, 5) the industrial accident of 2000 was the direct cause of Seely's 
disability, and 6) medical records suggested that degeneration was expected with Seely's 
type of injury and the subsequent procedures. (R. 98.) 
The ALJ ordered Columbia to pay Seely subsistence benefits and gave Columbia 
1) 30 days to submit notice if it intended to submit a reemployment plan pursuant to 
U.C.A. § 34A-2-413(6) and 2) 60 days from the date of the Findings of Fact (January 5, 
2007) to submit that reemployment plan. (R. 98.) 
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Columbia made no objection to the Findings of Fact. (R. 160.) On February 5, 
2007, Columbia sent notice that it intended to submit a reemployment plan. (R. 160.) 
Columbia instructed its vocational rehabilitation specialist to create a reemployment plan 
based on a 10-pound lifting restriction. (R. 160.) Columbia did not provide a copy of the 
ALJ's Findings of Fact to its vocational rehabilitation specialist. (R. 160.) The vocational 
rehab specialist did not contact Seely about his limitations. (R. 160.) Columbia submitted 
an untimely reemployment plan on April 26, 2007. (R. 123.) 
The ALJ held a hearing on the reemployment plan and found that the plan was 
inadequate because 1) the plan only considered retraining Seely for one job—that of a 
radiology technician; 2) the plan did not consider that Seely did not have a current license 
to work as a radiologic technologist and did not provide a plan to recertify Seely; 3) no 
indication was given as to what the weight and frequencies that would be required of 
Seely in that employment; 4) the plan did not consider Seely's medications; 5) the plan 
did not consider whether Seely could take days off; and 6) what the sit/stand 
requirements would be of that employment. (R. 124.) The ALJ found that the plan was 
not "reasonably designed to return [Seely] to gainful employment" and awarded Seely 
permanent total disability benefits. (R. 124-25.) 
Columbia filed a motion for review with the Labor Commission. (R. 130-34.) 
Columbia's primary argument was that it was unable to develop an adequate 
reemployment plan because the ALJ's Findings of Fact were inadequate. (R. 159.) 
The Labor Commission affirmed the ALJ. (R. 161.) First, the Labor Commission 
recognized that Columbia made no objection to the Findings of Fact and simply accepted 
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that Seely had a 10-pound weight restriction. (R. 160.) Second, the Labor Commission 
found that the reemployment plan was unreasonable because 1) the vocational rehab 
specialist had not contacted any potential employers to see if they could accommodate 
the plan's assumed 10-pound restriction; 2) the plan failed to consider Seely's lack of a 
current radiological technician license; and 3) the plan failed to consider Seely's use of 
narcotic medications in retraining him. (R. 160.) Third, the Labor Commission 
recognized that the reemployment plan considered only one job, that of a radiologic 
technician, which Seely could not perform. (R. 161.) The Labor Commission also noted 
that Columbia did not provide the vocational rehab specialist with the Findings of Fact, 
and that the vocational rehabilitation specialist did not contact Seely regarding his work 
restrictions. (R. 160.) 
Columbia now appeals the Labor Commission's decision to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court should affirm the Labor Commission's decision because the issue was 
not preserved, Columbia was not prejudiced by the alleged error, no conflicts were left 
unresolved by the ALJ, and the ALJ properly followed the correct procedures in 
awarding permanent total disability benefits. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE LABOR COMMISSION'S DECISION WAS CORRECT BECAUSE 1) 
COLUMBIA DID NOT PRESERVE THIS ISSUE FOR APPEAL, 2) THE 
REJECTED REEMPLOYMENT PLAN WAS DEFECTIVE FOR A 
MYRIAD OF REASONS, AND 3) THE ALJ'S FINDINGS OF FACT WAS 
CLEAR AND LEFT NO CONFLICTS UNRESOLVED. 
A. Columbia's silence as to the Findings of Fact did not preserve this issue. 
Columbia claims that the ALJ committed error by not resolving conflicts in the 
evidence. Specifically, Columbia believes that the ALJ did not resolve conflicts regarding 
Seely's work restrictions and that this alleged error made it impossible for Columbia to 
create a suitable reemployment plan. The Labor Commission affirmed the ALJ 
recognizing that Columbia did not object to the ALJ's Findings of Fact at the appropriate 
time, namely, before the creation of a reemployment plan. (R. 160.) Claimed errors must 
be raised in a timely fashion in order to facilitate correction during the proceedings. 
Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted). 
If a party objects to a judge's findings, that party cannot remain silent for the rest 
of the process and later claim judicial error. The Utah Supreme Court presented 
requirements for an issue to be preserved for appeal in a hearing: "(1) the issue must be 
raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be specifically raised; and (3) a party must 
introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority." Badger v. Brooklyn Canal 
Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998) (citations and internal quotations omitted). The 
purpose of this requirement is twofold. First, it "is to put the judge on notice of the 
asserted error and allow the opportunity for correction at that time in the course of the 
proceeding." Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted). Second, this requirement 
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"prevents a party from avoiding the issue at trial for strategic reasons only to raise the 
issue on appeal if the strategy fails." Tschaggenv v. Milbank Ins. Co., 163 P.3d 615, 620 
(Utah 2007). 
Columbia accepted the underlying Findings of Fact by its silence. When the ALJ 
submitted the Findings of Fact to the parties, Columbia did not object. No indication was 
given that Columbia was confused or found the restrictions in the Findings of Fact to be 
ambiguous. Columbia sought no clarification from the ALJ regarding the work 
restrictions. Instead, Columbia submitted notice that it intended to submit a 
reemployment plan and began pursuing that plan. There is no indication in Columbia's 
actions that, at that time, it was confused by the ALJ's Findings of Fact. 
Only after Columbia received an unfavorable outcome—the ALJ's Final Order 
awarding permanent total disability benefits after the hearing on the reemployment 
plan—did it voice its disapproval to the initial Findings of Fact and claim the ALJ 
committed an error by not resolving conflicting evidence. Such an action did not "put the 
judge on notice of the asserted error" and certainly did not "allow the opportunity for 
correction at that time in the course of the proceeding." Badger, 966 P.2d at 847. 
Columbia is impermissibly attempting to get a second chance at creating a reemployment 
plan after its first strategy failed. 
Columbia did not preserve this issue for appeal by remaining silent during the 
process and claiming judicial error after an unfavorable outcome. 
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B. The Labor Commission correctly rejected the reemployment plan. 
If this Court decides to address the merits of this case, then Seely contends that the 
Labor Commission's decision to affirm the ALJ was correct because 1) Columbia 
suffered no prejudice by the alleged error, 2) it is legally permissible for an ALJ to reject 
a defective reemployment plan, and 3) there were no conflicts left unresolved by the ALJ. 
1. Columbia was not prejudiced by the alleged error. 
Columbia asserts that the ALJ committed an error by not providing specific work 
restrictions which led to Columbia's inability to create a suitable reemployment plan. 
However, Columbia's reemployment plan was defective for reasons unrelated to the 
alleged confusion regarding the work restrictions. In order for a judicial error to compel 
reversal, it must have been prejudicial. Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251, 1255 (Utah 
1997). A reversal is in order only if the error had a reasonable likelihood of affecting the 
outcome of a case. Id. 
Columbia's reemployment plan was defective independent of any work restriction 
discrepancy. The ALJ noted in her Findings of Fact that Seely's "injuries prevent him 
from performing the essential function of lifting required of a radiology technician." (R. 
97.) Yet, Columbia's reemployment plan considered rehabilitating Seely for one and only 
one job—that of a radiology technician. (R. 124.) In affirming the ALJ's decision, the 
Labor Commission noted that the reemployment plan failed to consider both 1) Seely's 
lack of a current radiology technician's license and 2) substantial use of narcotic 
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medications to manage his pain.1 (R. 160.) Those flaws are attributable to both 1) 
Columbia's failure to provide the vocational rehab specialist with a copy of the ALJ's 
Findings of Fact and 2) the vocational rehabilitation specialist's failure to contact Seely 
and inquire about his license status. Id. Additionally, the Labor Commission recognized 
that the plan was internally defective as the vocational rehab specialist had not contacted 
any potential employers to see if they could accommodate the reemployment plan's 
assumed 10-pound weight restriction.2 Id. These flaws rendered the plan defective and 
were the result of Columbia's and its vocational rehabilitation specialist's failures, 
independent of any alleged judicial error creating confusion regarding work restrictions. 
Columbia's multiple errors in creating the reemployment plan eliminate any 
reasonable likelihood that the outcome of this claim would have been different had the 
alleged judicial error not occurred. Therefore, Columbia was not prejudiced and reversal 
of the Labor Commission is not in order. 
These flaws are inadequacies directly relating to Findings of Fact. Columbia's argument 
avoids challenging the factual findings in order to have a question of law standard. If 
Columbia were to challenge these facts, which evidence that Columbia was not 
prejudiced by the alleged judicial error, or any other findings of fact, that challenge 
would be under a question of fact, substantial evidence standard. See Hymas v. Labor 
Comm % 200 P.3d 218, 222 (Utah Ct. App. 2008). 
This flaw refers to Columbia's failure to contact any potential employers to see if they 
could accommodate Seely. Seely does not know how Columbia came to a 10-pound 
restriction and that is irrelevant to this argument. The fact is that Columbia assumed a 10-
pound weight restriction yet contacted no potential employers to see if they could 
accommodate that restriction. Such a failure renders the proposed plan inadequate and 
internally defective. 
12 
2. The Labor Commission's rejection of a defective reemployment plan is 
legally permissible. 
Columbia asserts that the ALJ did not resolve the conflicts regarding Seely's work 
restrictions in her Findings of Fact. That inadequacy in the Findings of Fact, Columbia 
argues, led to a defective reemployment plan. "The adequacy of findings is a question of 
law" to be reviewed "under a correction of error standard." Strate v. Labor Comm'n, 136 
P.3d 1273, 1276-77 (Utah App. 2007). 
It is legally correct for the Labor Commission to reject a defective reemployment 
plan. Color Country Mgmt. v. Labor Commission, 38 P.3d 969, 973 (Utah App. 2001). In 
Color Country, an ALJ rejected a defective reemployment plan because it was 1) based 
on work restrictions materially different than those specified by the doctor and 2) the 
reemployment plan drafter was never given a copy of the ALJ's initial findings of fact or 
the doctor's restrictions. Id. In that case, this Court determined that "[t]he Commission 
correctly applied the law in determining that the plan was not reasonable." Id. at 974. 
Just like Color Country, Columbia's reemployment plan was defective. 
Columbia's reemployment plan was based on work restrictions that were materially 
different than those indicated by the ALJ.3 Like Color Country, Columbia failed to 
provide a copy of the ALJ's order to the vocational rehabilitation specialist responsible 
3
 As discussed below, the ALJ indicated a 35 pound weight restriction and Columbia 
created a reemployment plan based on a 10 pound weight restriction. It is unclear to the 
Respondent exactly how Columbia reached that 10 pound conclusion, but Respondent 
does not dispute that, had the reemployment plan been adequate under terms for a 10 
pound weight restriction, it would also have been adequate under Seely's 35 pound 
weight restriction. 
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for drafting the reemployment plan. (R. 160.) Additionally, the vocational rehabilitation 
specialist did not contact Mr. Seely to obtain information regarding his work restrictions 
and had various other inadequacies discussed above. Just like Color Country, the ALJ 
"correctly applied the law in determining that the plan was not reasonable." Color 
Country, 38 P.3d at 974. 
Columbia's reemployment plan was plagued with deficiencies. These deficiencies 
rendered the reemployment plan defective and it was a correct application of the law for 
the Labor Commission to reject the defective plan. 
3. The ALJ did not leave any conflicts unresolved. 
Columbia asserts that the Findings of Fact was inadequate because multiple work 
restrictions created a conflict that went unresolved by the ALJ. However, from the ALJ's 
findings of fact adopted by the Labor Commission, it is clear that Seely's work 
restrictions were not left unresolved. "The adequacy of findings is a question of law" to 
be reviewed "under a correction of error standard." Strate v. Labor Comm'n, 136 P.3d 
1273, 1276-77 (Utah App. 2007). 
The ALJ set out to summarize Seely's long medical history on pages 1-4 of the 
January 5, 2007 Findings of Fact. (R. 93-96.) That history included at least 4 work 
injuries, 3 surgeries, and multiple injections and other treatments from 1996 through 
2005. Id. During this course of injuries, surgeries, and treatments, it is expected that an 
injured worker's condition would not remain constant but improve at times and decline at 
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others. The ALJ portrayed those ups and downs by including Seely's work restrictions at 
certain times throughout his history. Id. 
The ALJ concluded the summary noting that Seely testified he could only 
sit/stand for 30 minutes at a time and also that Dr. Dall and Dr. Chung agreed upon 
Seely's impairment ratings. (R. 96.) The ALJ then unequivocally concludes, "The 
Petitioner is not capable of transferring bedridden or wheelchair patients as he used to do. 
His maximum lift is 35 pounds and if he can find employment with that accommodation, 
he can work." Id. Whether this conclusion is part of Dr. Chung's and Dr. Dall's 
agreement or whether it is the ALJ's own conclusion is unclear.4 What is clear, however, 
is that the ALJ was concluding the summary with Seely's work restrictions at the time of 
the hearing—35 pounds.5 This is especially true considering the ALJ follows the 
statement with Seely's age, education, and previous work history which, together with 
the work restrictions, are the criteria to be evaluated under UCA § 34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv) in 
4
 Either option is permissible. If it is the weight restriction most recently agreed upon by 
both Dr. Chung and Dr. Dall, then it is "clear, uncontroverted and capable of only one 
conclusion." Strate v. Labor Com'n, 136 P.3d 1273, 1276 (Utah App. 2006). If it is the 
ALJ's conclusion, then this conclusion satisfies Carter v. Labor Comm 'n Appeals Board 
which states, "[i]t is the province of the Board, not appellate courts, to resolve conflicting 
evidence, and where inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same evidence, it is 
for the board to draw the inferences." 153 P.3d 763, 767 (Utah App. 2006). 
5
 Respondent believes that the weight restriction of 35 pounds was the ALJ's own 
conclusion inferred from the record. Respondent believes this because throughout the 
medical summary, the ALJ referred to the work restrictions by either 1) with the doctor's 
name, followed by a verb such as "opined," "indicated," or "recommended" followed by 
the weight restriction or 2) followed the weight restriction with a direct reference to the 
medical exhibit. On Page 4 of the Finding of Fact, the ALJ does not immediately precede 
the final weight restriction of 35 pounds with a doctor's name and verb nor does the ALJ 
follow the restriction with a citation. Therefore, it appears that the weight restriction 
provided is the ALJ's inferred conclusion. 
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order to determine permanent total disability. Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 164 
P.3d 384, 393 (Utah 2007). 
Columbia attempts to obscure that simple finding by jumbling the ALJ's 
organized medical history. Petitioner's Brief, 10. In that recitation, Columbia abandons 
the ALJ's original chronological order and omits the dates from 3 of its 7 excerpts. Id. 
For instance, the dates of examples 1,3, and 7 are omitted and are July 28, 2003, January 
20, 2004, and October 17, 2001, respectively. If the ALJ had presented the medical 
history as Columbia does, it would be very unclear. However, the ALJ composed a very 
organized recitation leading to a clear conclusion of work restrictions, which the Labor 
Commission adopted. 
Additionally, the ALJ's consideration of the untimely reemployment plan based 
on a 10 pound weight restriction does not muddle the ALJ's finding of a 35 pound weight 
restriction. The ALJ's responsibility is to examine a submitted reemployment plan and 
determine whether it is adequate. See Color Country Mgmt. v. Labor Comm'n, 38 P.3d 
969, 973 (Utah App. 2001) (stating that it is the ALJ's responsibility to examine the 
reasonableness of a reemployment plan). Since a 10 pound weight restriction would 
qualify for an individual who has a 35 pound maximum weight restriction, considering 
the plan as a whole was prudent. The ALJ found that the reemployment plan was 
inadequate because of the various deficiencies discussed above. 
The work restrictions were clear from the Findings of Fact. Columbia's assertion 
that the ALJ left conflicts of evidence unresolved is unfounded. 
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Summary: Columbia contends that the ALJ did not resolve all conflicts in her 
initial Findings of Fact. However, Columbia waited until after acting on those Findings of 
Fact and an unfavorable outcome before it made its objection known. Therefore, 
Columbia did not preserve the issue for appeal. If this Court decides to determine this 
case on the merits, there still remains no reason to reverse the Labor Commission because 
Columbia was not prejudiced by the alleged judicial error, it was legally permissible for 
the Labor Commission to reject the defective plan, and Columbia's allegation of 
unresolved conflicts are unfounded. Therefore, this Court should affirm the Labor 
Commission's award of permanent total disability benefits. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE COMMISSION'S DECISION 
BECAUSE THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE PROPERLY 
FOLLOWED THE PROCEDURES IN AWARDING SEELY PERMANENT 
TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS 
Columbia's second issue is difficult to decipher. It appears that Columbia 
disagrees that Seely is permanently totally disabled because Seely did not prove he could 
not work nor did the ALJ make adequate findings that Seely could not work. This 
argument is at least partially, if not wholly, based on the allegation that the ALJ failed to 
resolve conflicts in the evidence which is addressed in Part I above and incorporated 
herein. 
Columbia also claims that "there were no findings made to support the conclusion 
that respondent was permanently and totally disabled except for the brief finding where 
the ALJ determines that the respondent has 'significant sit/stand restrictions,'" followed 
by evidence that, Columbia asserts, proves Seely can work. Petitioner's Brief, 14. 
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However, Columbia misunderstands the process as to how the Labor Commission awards 
permanent total disability benefits and Columbia's assertion that the ALJ failed to 
adequately follow that process is unfounded in the law. 
Awarding permanent total disability benefits is a process that involves various 
considerations. First, the injured worker has the burden of proving the four requirements: 
1) he is not gainfully employed; 2) he has an impairment that limits his ability to do basic 
work activities; 3) the impairments prevent the employee from performing the essential 
functions of the work activities for which the employee has been qualified until the time 
of the industrial accident; and 4) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably 
available taking into consideration the employee's age, education, past work experience, 
medical capacity, and residual functional capacity. Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 
164 P.3d 384, 396 (Utah 2007). 
More than Columbia's mere allegation that the ALJ stated "respondent has 
'significant sit/stand restrictions,'" (Petitioner's Brief, page 14) the ALJ noted each 
requirement was met in the Conclusions of Law section of her January 5, 2007 order, 
which was adopted by the Labor Commission. Specifically, the ALJ noted that 1) Seely 
was not employed; 2) he has sustained significant impairments "indicated by his 
restrictions, limitations, impairment ratings, etc."; 3) Seely could not perform the 
essential functions of a radiology technician; and 4) Seely is 58, has a high school 
diploma, lifting restrictions (35 pounds) as well as sit/stand restrictions, has no training 
other than for a job as a radiology technician, and cannot perform other work. (R. 97-98.) 
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Once an ALJ finds that an injured worker is permanently totally disabled, the 
employer is given an opportunity to show that rehabilitation is possible by submitting a 
reemployment plan. The ALJ reviews that reemployment plan and either accepts or 
rejects it. Color Country Mgmt. v. Labor Comm'n, 38 P.3d 969, 973 (Utah App. 2001). 
In this case, the ALJ appropriately gave Columbia the opportunity to provide a 
reemployment plan. Columbia submitted a reemployment plan which the ALJ rejected, 
therefore finding that successful rehabilitation was not possible. 
Lastly, if the ALJ rejects the reemployment plan, then the injured worker is 
presumed to have carried his burden in proving he is entitled to permanent total disability 
benefits. See id. (Under similar facts as this case, the Utah Court of Appeals upheld the 
Labor Commission's determination that the injured worker had carried her burden of 
proving permanent total disability after the rejection of a reemployment plan). 
Columbia's claim that the ALJ committed error is without merit. Columbia asserts 
that, since there was "significant evidence, including the various opinions of numerous 
physicians, showing that respondent could be returned to work within certain 
restrictions," the ALJ could not permissibly determine Seely was permanently totally 
disabled. Petitioner's Brief, 14. However, as noted above, awarding permanent total 
disability awards is a process and consists of many more considerations than work 
restrictions alone. 
Seely met his burden in proving permanent total disability. Columbia was given an 
opportunity to submit a reasonable reemployment plan, which it failed to do. The ALJ 
made no error and stated in the Findings of Fact each consideration required to show 
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permanent total disability. Those findings were adopted by the Labor Commission in 
affirming the rejection of the reemployment plan and awarding permanent total disability 
benefits to Seely. No error was made and, therefore, this Court should affirm the Labor 
Commission's ruling. 
CONCLUSION 
Columbia's appeal is untimely. Columbia alleges that the ALJ's Findings of Fact, 
adopted by the Labor Commission, were unclear. However, instead of objecting to the 
findings of fact at the time they were presented, Columbia gave notice that it intended to 
submit a reemployment plan. Only after the ALJ made its final determination of 
permanent total disability did Columbia voice its complaint, which the Labor 
Commission recognized was untimely. The alleged judicial error would not have affected 
the outcome of the claim and is therefore not prejudicial because Columbia's 
reemployment plan was plagued with deficiencies independent of the alleged error. It was 
legally permissible for the Labor Commission to reject that defective reemployment plan. 
Additionally, Columbia's allegation of judicial error for not resolving conflicting work 
restrictions is without merit as the ALJ clearly indicated Seely's work restrictions at the 
time of the hearing. The ALJ committed no error in this process and the Labor 
Commission properly awarded permanent total disability benefits to Seely. Therefore, 
this Court should affirm the Labor Commission's ruling. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
Sandra N. Dredge 
Counsel for Respondent Stewart 
Seely 
February 9, 2011 
21 
ADDENDUM 
Reproduction of determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules: 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-l-303(6): (6) If an order is appealed to the court of appeals after 
the party appealing the order has exhausted all administrative appeals, the court of 
appeals has jurisdiction to: 
(a) review, reverse, remand, or annul any order of the commissioner or Appeals 
Board; or 
(b) suspend or delay the operation or execution of the order of the commissioner or 
Appeals Board being appealed. 
Utah Code Ann. 34A-2-413. Permanent total disability -- Amount of payments — 
Rehabilitation. 
(1) (a) In the case of a permanent total disability resulting from an industrial accident 
or occupational disease, the employee shall receive compensation as outlined in this 
section. 
(b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the employee 
must prove by a preponderance of evidence that: 
(i) the employee sustained a significant impairment or combination of impairments as 
a result of the industrial accident or occupational disease that gives rise to the permanent 
total disability entitlement; 
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled; and 
(iii) the industrial accident or occupational disease is the direct cause of the 
employee's permanent total disability. 
(c) To establish that an employee is permanently totally disabled the employee must 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: 
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed; 
(ii) the employee has an impairment or combination of impairments that limit the 
employee's ability to do basic work activities; 
(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused impairment or combination of impairments 
prevent the employee from performing the essential functions of the work activities for 
which the employee has been qualified until the time of the industrial accident or 
occupational disease that is the basis for the employee's permanent total disability claim; 
and 
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking into 
consideration the employee's: 
(A) age; 
(B) education; 
(C) past work experience; 
(D) medical capacity; and 
(E) residual functional capacity. 
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(d) Evidence of an employee's entitlement to disability benefits other than those 
provided under this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, if relevant: 
(i) may be presented to the commission; 
(ii) is not binding; and 
(iii) creates no presumption of an entitlement under this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act. 
(e) In determining under Subsections (l)(b) and (c) whether an employee cannot 
perform other work reasonably available, the following may not be considered: 
(i) whether the employee is incarcerated in a facility operated by or contracting with a 
federal, state, county, or municipal government to house a criminal offender in either a 
secure or nonsecure setting; or 
(ii) whether the employee is not legally eligible to be employed because of a reason 
unrelated to the impairment or combination of impairments. 
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 312-week 
entitlement, compensation is 66-2/3% of the employee's average weekly wage at the time 
of the injury, limited as follows: 
(a) compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state average weekly 
wage at the time of the injury; 
(b) (i) subject to Subsection (2)(b)(ii), compensation per week may not be less than the 
sum of $45 per week and: 
(A) $5 for a dependent spouse; and 
(B) $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four 
dependent minor children; and 
(ii) the amount calculated under Subsection (2)(b)(i) may not exceed: 
(A) the maximum established in Subsection (2)(a); or 
(B) the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury; and 
(c) after the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation rate under 
Subsection (2)(b) is 36% of the current state average weekly wage, rounded to the nearest 
dollar. 
(3) This Subsection (3) applies to claims resulting from an accident or disease arising 
out of and in the course of the employee's employment on or before June 30, 1994. 
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312 weeks of 
permanent total disability compensation except as outlined in Section 34A-2-703 as in 
effect on the date of injury. 
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay compensation for 
any combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and Sections 34 A-
2-410 through 34A-2-412 and Part 5, Industrial Noise, in excess of the amount of 
compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total 
disability compensation rate under Subsection (2). 
(c) The Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall for an overpayment of compensation 
described in Subsection (3)(b), reimburse the overpayment: 
(i) to the employer or its insurance carrier; and 
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(ii) out of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund's liability to the employee. 
(d) After an employee receives compensation from the employee's employer, its 
insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of disabilities 
amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the applicable permanent total disability 
compensation rate, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall pay all remaining permanent 
total disability compensation. 
(e) Employers' Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the 
employer or its insurance carrier satisfies its liability under this Subsection (3) or Section 
34A-2-703. 
(4) This Subsection (4) applies to claims resulting from an accident or disease arising 
out of and in the course of the employee's employment on or after July 1, 1994. 
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for permanent total disability 
compensation. 
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay compensation for 
any combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and Sections 34 A-
2-410 through 34A-2-412 and Part 5, Industrial Noise, in excess of the amount of 
compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total 
disability compensation rate under Subsection (2). 
(c) The employer or its insurance carrier may recoup the overpayment of 
compensation described in Subsection (4) by reasonably offsetting the overpayment 
against future liability paid before or after the initial 312 weeks. 
(5) (a) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability is not final, unless 
otherwise agreed to by the parties, until: 
(i) an administrative law judge reviews a summary of reemployment activities 
undertaken pursuant to Chapter 8a, Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act; 
(ii) the employer or its insurance carrier submits to the administrative law judge: 
(A) a reemployment plan as prepared by a qualified rehabilitation provider reasonably 
designed to return the employee to gainful employment; or 
(B) notice that the employer or its insurance carrier will not submit a plan; and 
(iii) the administrative law judge, after notice to the parties, holds a hearing, unless 
otherwise stipulated, to: 
(A) consider evidence regarding rehabilitation; and 
(B) review any reemployment plan submitted by the employer or its insurance carrier 
under Subsection (5)(a)(ii). 
(b) Before commencing the procedure required by Subsection (5)(a), the 
administrative law judge shall order: 
(i) the initiation of permanent total disability compensation payments to provide for 
the employee's subsistence; and 
(ii) the payment of any undisputed disability or medical benefits due the employee. 
(c) Notwithstanding Subsection (5)(a), an order for payment of benefits described in 
Subsection (5)(b) is considered a final order for purposes of Section 34A-2-212. 
(d) The employer or its insurance carrier shall be given credit for any disability 
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payments made under Subsection (5)(b) against its ultimate disability compensation 
liability under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
(e) An employer or its insurance carrier may not be ordered to submit a reemployment 
plan. If the employer or its insurance carrier voluntarily submits a plan, the plan is subject 
to Subsections (5)(e)(i) through (iii). 
(i) The plan may include, but not require an employee to pay for: 
(A) retraining; 
(B) education; 
(C) medical and disability compensation benefits; 
(D) job placement services; or 
(E) incentives calculated to facilitate reemployment. 
(ii) The plan shall include payment of reasonable disability compensation to provide 
for the employee's subsistence during the rehabilitation process. 
(iii) The employer or its insurance carrier shall diligently pursue the reemployment 
plan. The employer's or insurance carrier's failure to diligently pursue the reemployment 
plan is cause for the administrative law judge on the administrative law judge's own 
motion to make a final decision of permanent total disability. 
(f) If a preponderance of the evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is not 
possible, the administrative law judge shall order that the employee be paid weekly 
permanent total disability compensation benefits. 
(g) If a preponderance of the evidence shows that pursuant to a reemployment plan, as 
prepared by a qualified rehabilitation provider and presented under Subsection (5)(e), an 
employee could immediately or without unreasonable delay return to work but for the 
following, an administrative law judge shall order that the employee be denied the 
payment of weekly permanent total disability compensation benefits: 
(i) incarceration in a facility operated by or contracting with a federal, state, county, or 
municipal government to house a criminal offender in either a secure or nonsecure 
setting; or 
(ii) not being legally eligible to be employed because of a reason unrelated to the 
impairment or combination of impairments. 
(6) (a) The period of benefits commences on the date the employee became 
permanently totally disabled, as determined by a final order of the commission based on 
the facts and evidence, and ends: 
(i) with the death of the employee; or 
(ii) when the employee is capable of returning to regular, steady work. 
(b) An employer or its insurance carrier may provide or locate for a permanently 
totally disabled employee reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time work in a job 
earning at least minimum wage, except that the employee may not be required to accept 
the work to the extent that it would disqualify the employee from Social Security 
disability benefits. 
(c) An employee shall: 
(i) fully cooperate in the placement and employment process; and 
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(ii) accept the reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time work. 
(d) In a consecutive four-week period when an employee's gross income from the 
work provided under Subsection (6)(b) exceeds $500, the employer or insurance carrier 
may reduce the employee's permanent total disability compensation by 50% of the 
employee's income in excess of $500. 
(e) If a work opportunity is not provided by the employer or its insurance carrier, a 
permanently totally disabled employee may obtain medically appropriate, part-time work 
subject to the offset provisions of Subsection (6)(d). 
(f) (i) The commission shall establish rules regarding the part-time work and offset, 
(ii) The adjudication of disputes arising under this Subsection (6) is governed by Part 
8, Adjudication. 
(g) The employer or its insurance carrier has the burden of proof to show that 
medically appropriate part-time work is available. 
(h) The administrative law judge may: 
(i) excuse an employee from participation in any work: 
(A) that would require the employee to undertake work exceeding the employee's: 
(I) medical capacity; or 
(II) residual functional capacity; or 
(B) for good cause; or 
(ii) allow the employer or its insurance carrier to reduce permanent total disability 
benefits as provided in Subsection (6)(d) when reasonable, medically appropriate, part-
time work is offered, but the employee fails to fully cooperate. 
(7) When an employee is rehabilitated or the employee's rehabilitation is possible but 
the employee has some loss of bodily function, the award shall be for permanent partial 
disability. 
(8) As determined by an administrative law judge, an employee is not entitled to 
disability compensation, unless the employee fully cooperates with any evaluation or 
reemployment plan under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. The 
administrative law judge shall dismiss without prejudice the claim for benefits of an 
employee if the administrative law judge finds that the employee fails to fully cooperate, 
unless the administrative law judge states specific findings on the record justifying 
dismissal with prejudice. 
(9) (a) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of the following constitutes 
total and permanent disability that is compensated according to this section: 
(i) both hands; 
(ii) both arms; 
(iii) both feet; 
(iv) both legs; 
(v) both eyes; or 
(vi) any combination of two body members described in this Subsection (9)(a). 
(b) A finding of permanent total disability pursuant to Subsection (9)(a) is final. 
(10) (a) An insurer or self-insured employer may periodically reexamine a permanent 
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total disability claim, except those based on Subsection (9), for which the insurer or self-
insured employer had or has payment responsibility to determine whether the employee 
remains permanently totally disabled. 
(b) Reexamination may be conducted no more than once every three years after an 
award is final, unless good cause is shown by the employer or its insurance carrier to 
allow more frequent reexaminations. 
(c) The reexamination may include: 
(i) the review of medical records; 
(ii) employee submission to one or more reasonable medical evaluations; 
(iii) employee submission to one or more reasonable rehabilitation evaluations and 
retraining efforts; 
(iv) employee disclosure of Federal Income Tax Returns; 
(v) employee certification of compliance with Section 34A-2-110; and 
(vi) employee completion of one or more sworn affidavits or questionnaires approved 
by the division. 
(d) The insurer or self-insured employer shall pay for the cost of a reexamination with 
appropriate employee reimbursement pursuant to rule for reasonable travel allowance and 
per diem as well as reasonable expert witness fees incurred by the employee in 
supporting the employee's claim for permanent total disability benefits at the time of 
reexamination. 
(e) If an employee fails to fully cooperate in the reasonable reexamination of a 
permanent total disability finding, an administrative law judge may order the suspension 
of the employee's permanent total disability benefits until the employee cooperates with 
the reexamination. 
(f) (i) If the reexamination of a permanent total disability finding reveals evidence that 
reasonably raises the issue of an employee's continued entitlement to permanent total 
disability compensation benefits, an insurer or self-insured employer may petition the 
Division of Adjudication for a rehearing on that issue. The insurer or self-insured 
employer shall include with the petition, documentation supporting the insurer's or self-
insured employer's belief that the employee is no longer permanently totally disabled. 
(ii) If the petition under Subsection (10)(f)(i) demonstrates good cause, as determined 
by the Division of Adjudication, an administrative law judge shall adjudicate the issue at 
a hearing. 
(iii) Evidence of an employee's participation in medically appropriate, part-time work 
may not be the sole basis for termination of an employee's permanent total disability 
entitlement, but the evidence of the employee's participation in medically appropriate, 
part-time work under Subsection (6) may be considered in the reexamination or hearing 
with other evidence relating to the employee's status and condition. 
(g) In accordance with Section 34A-1-309, the administrative law judge may award 
reasonable attorney fees to an attorney retained by an employee to represent the 
employee's interests with respect to reexamination of the permanent total disability 
27 
finding, except if the employee does not prevail, the attorney fees shall be set at $1,000. 
The attorney fees awarded shall be paid by the employer or its insurance carrier in 
addition to the permanent total disability compensation benefits due. 
(h) During the period of reexamination or adjudication, if the employee fully 
cooperates, each insurer, self-insured employer, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund 
shall continue to pay the permanent total disability compensation benefits due the 
employee. 
(11) If any provision of this section, or the application of any provision to any person 
or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of this section is given effect without the 
invalid provision or application. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-801(8)(a): Within 30 days after the day on which the decision 
of the commissioner or Appeals Board is issued, an aggrieved party may secure judicial 
review by commencing an action in the court of appeals against the commissioner or 
Appeals Board for the review of the decision of the commissioner or Appeals Board. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(l): As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the 
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(a): (2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state 
agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of 
the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and 
Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands 
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, 
Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
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